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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
PERCY MOUNTEER,
Appellant,
v.

Supreme Court Case No. 8703

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Respondent.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE PROCEEDING BELOW
Appellant, Percy Mounteer, ("Mounteer") filed an acti
in Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, again
respondant, Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L") alleging that
UP&L was liable for damages for slander and intentional
infliction of emotional distress committed by Niki Larsen
("Larsen"), one of its employees while Larsen was acting within
the scope of her employment.

This Appeal is from an Order of

Dismissal by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge of The Thir
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The Supreme

Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter by
virtue of Utah Code Annotated §78-2-3(i)(1987) and §78-2(a)-3 a:
an appeal in a civil matter from a final ruling or judgment of <
District Court in which the Court of Appeals does not have
original jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Is an employer liable in tort for defamation and

intentional infliction of emotional distress by its employee upon
a fellow employee when the offending employee is acting in the
scope of her actual or apparent authority?
2.

In granting a Motion to Dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may a Court make
findings of fact upon which to base the granting of the motion?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an Appeal from an Order of Dismissal granted
under a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.

Mounteer, the plaintiff

below, had alleged that UP&L was liable for slander and
intentional infliction of emotional distress perpetrated by its
employee Larsen while Larsen was acting within the scope of her
actual or apparent authority.

The Court below granted UP&L's

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) holding that an employer is
not vicariously liable for intentional acts of the employee and
that the employer is not liable for the slander of one employee
by another unless the employee was speaking with the employer's
actual knowledge or approval.

The Court found that the acts of

Larsen were in violation of UP&L policy and that UP&L did not
direct Larsen to make the defamatory statements.

The findings

regarding violation of company policy and that Larsen was not
directed to make the statements are believed by Mounteer to be
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findings of fact improperly made by the Court in granting the
12(b)(6) Motion.

The Court also held that Utah law does not

recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotion
distress.

This last holding has not been appealed.

The matter

was urged below in a good faith effort to seek reversal of a
prior precedentf but because appeal of that issue could unduly
complicate and lengthen the appeal process, it has been abandon
insofar as this appeal is concerned and will not be raised agai
in this case.
The order dismissing Mounteerfs action was granted
without prejudice (Record page 126, hereinafter "R.
apparently to allow Mounteer to file

")

an action against Larsen

However, since Mounteer has chosen not to file against Larsen,
the order of the District Court has become a final order and cai
be reviewed by this Court.

The Complaint, the Court's Minute

Entry and its Order of Dismissal are all attached as addenda
hereto.
The following are the relevant facts, as set forth in
the pleadings of Mounteer, and must be deemed admitted for
purposes of a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Case:
1.

On or about October 6, 1986, plaintiff was workinc

at a mine in Emery County, as an employee of Utah Power & Light
Company ("UP&L").
2.

R. 3.

On the date in question, plaintiff was in a

substantially elevated state of stress because of his prior
involvement in the Wilberg mine disaster of December, 1984, and
various events that occurred subsequent to that disaster that
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involved Mounteer.
3.

R. 3-4.

UP&L employed Larsen as a security officer.

Larsen, as an agent of UP&L, was instructed by UP&L to
investigate Mounteer for possible drug use.
4.

R. 2, 4.

While in the course of her assignment to conduct a

drug investigation, Larsen interviewed Mounteer on the mine
premises on or about October 6, 1986.
5.

R. 2, 4.

After a short interview wherein Mounteer denied any

drug use, Larsen spoke to a mine superintendent over a company
loudspeaker and accused Mounteer of being on drugs. Many other
employees heard the allegations over the loudspeaker that went
throughout the entire mine.

Mounteer suffered considerable

damage because of the allegations.

The allegations were false.

R. 2, 4.
6.

All of the actions of Larsen were within the

scope of her actual or apparent authority as granted by her
principal, UP&L.
7.

R. 2, 4.

The court dismissed the action on the grounds that

UP&L is not liable for the actions of its employee, Larsen,
unless UP&L actually directed her to make defamatory statements.
Order of Dismissal, R. 126.
8.

UP&L also raised the issue of a bar by Worker's

Compensation, but the court does not appear to have based its
decision upon that particular issue.

4

R. 17-18, 126.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UP&L is liable for defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress by virtue of the actions of its
employee Larsen against fellow employee Mounteer.

The injury

caused to Mounteer by UP&L's employeef Larsen, is not an injury
arising from an "accident" in the course of employment as define*
in Utah statute and case law.

It is, therefore, outside the

exclusivity provision of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act and
is justiciable before a court of competent jurisdiction.
The issue presented in this case is whether Mounteer
may pursue a cause of action against his employer UP&L for the
slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress
committed by a fellow employee, Larsen, while she was engaged in
an activity specifically initiated and directed by UP&L.

The

Court's order below holds that unless UP&L specifically directed
the injurious action itself, it does not bear responsibility for
its employees' actions even though those actions were carried out
in furtherance of the a directive.

Larsen was the agent of UP&L

and her actions in carrying out the investigation of Mounteer for
alleged drug abuse were in direct response to the directive of
UP&L.

Whether Larsen carried out that directive within the

guidelines established by UP&L is irrelevant to the issue of
liability.

So long as the employee's intentions were to fulfill

her obligation as an employee of UP&L, she was operating within
the scope of her authority as UP&L's employee.

UP&L is,

therefore, vicariously liable for any tortious conduct which she
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may have committed in that capacity.
UP&L's position is that unless the slander and
intentional infliction of emotional distress were done
specifically at the request of UP&Lf UP&L bore no responsibility.
In the cases cited by UP&L, the offending employee abandoned the
purpose of serving the employer and sought to serve his own in
injuring or assaulting a fellow employee.

The fact that the

assault or injury took place upon a fellow employee or upon the
employer's premises or during working hours was simply a matter
of coincidence.

In those cases, the employer may not be held

liable for the intentional tort of a fellow employee.

However,

in this case Larsen's entire reason for performing the acts
complained of herein were in furtherance of her duties and
responsibilities as a UP&L employee and were not motivated in any
way by a desire to serve her own motives or purposes. Therefore,
UP&L, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, is liable for
the acts of its employee even though the employee may have
performed those acts in a manner contrary to company policy.
In entering its Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint,
the Court included within its order items which are apparently
findings of fact and upon which the Court appears to have based
its order.

Such findings of fact are inappropriate on a 12(b)(6)

Motion to Dismiss since there is no evidence presented to the
Court upon which such findings may be made.

Allegations

contained in plaintiff's Complaint must be assumed admitted for
purposes of a 12(b)(6) Motion.

However, any allegations

contained in the complaint are based upon information and belief
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since no discovery had occurred at the time the 12(b)(6) Motion
was filed.

Therefore, any possible set of facts that could be

proven at trial must be weighed in favor of a plaintiff resisting
a 12(b)(6) Motion,

The order of the Court entered in this mattei

is, therefore, manifest error.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESPONDENT UP&L IS LIABLE FOR THE SLANDER
AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS OF
ONE OF ITS EMPLOYEES WHILE THAT EMPLOYEE WAS ACTING
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY.
The main issue in this appeal is whether UP&L, as an
employer, is liable for the slander and intentional infliction of
emotional distress committed by an employee acting within the
scope of her actual or apparent authority.
The court below based its dismissal on the fact that
UP&L allegedly did not specifically direct Larsen, a security
guard engaged in the performance of a UP&L ordered drug
investigation, to slander or otherwise harm Mounteer.
hearing, the court stated:
[With reference to paragraph 9 of the
complaint] But [that] doesn't say
that she was authorized to go out and
publish her investigation to anybody or
to tell the plaintiff here about it, or
to tell anybody else about it, other than
to investigate; that's all your allegation
is. R. 164, Ins. 19-13.
Now, where did you say in your complaint,
anywhere, that her authority in that
investigation was to do anything but
investigate and report to her superiors?
R. 165, Ins. 21-23.
7

At the

And what Mr. Proctor is saying is that
[it] may well be true; but Utah Power &
Light didn't tell her, in any way, to
stand upon the roof of the buildings and
broadcast to the world either that she
was conducting as a snitch and
investigator more specifically, that he
was in fact on drugs. R. 167, Ins 13-18.
The court took an unduly narrow view on what acts
advanced the cause of Ms. Larsen's agency stating at one point:
The problem I see is, that the act of
which you're complaining in this case,
and the act we have been talking about in
these examples, is an intentional act by
you (sic) [i.e. Ms. Niki Larsen, the
security officer of UP&L], which does not
forward the purpose of the agency, which
was not contemplated in the authority
given. R. 168, Ins 10.14.
The court's order of dismissal then recited the
following:
Utah Power & Light Company is not liable
for defamatory statements made by its
employee against the plaintiff, a
co-employee, unless Utah Power & Light
Company directed the employee to make the
defamatory statements. R. 126, ^ 3.
The District Court's legal reasoning in this case is manifest
error.

If one accepts as true the facts as alleged by Mounteer,

then one must accept the following: UP&L's agent, Niki Larsen,
was engaged in a drug investigation at the direction of her
employer at the time that she slandered Mounteer; and that the
act of slander was committed in furtherance of that investigation.
In fact, the slander occurred as Ms. Larsen was reporting to
another UP&L employee located on the mine property, through a
public intercom, that Mr. Mounteer was allegedly on drugs.
Therefore, Larsen was, by definition, performing her employer's

8

errand.
It is hornbook law that a master is liable for the
defamation of a servant acting within the scope of his or her
authority.

The Restatement of Agency 2df § 247, provides as

follows:
A master is subject to liability for
defamatory statements made by a servant
acting within the scope of his
employment, or, as to those hearing or
reading the statement, within his
apparent authority.
As to when an act is within the scope of the employer
authority, Comment C of § 247 makes the following relevant
statement:
If the master employs a servant to speak
for him, he is subject to liability if
the servant makes a mistake as to the
truth of the words spoken or as to the
justification for speaking them, or even
if he speaks with an improper motive,
provided that he acts at least in part to
serve his employer's purposes. The
master may be liable even though the
servant knows the statement to be untrue,
as where the manager of a store, for the
purpose of obtaining an admission from a
suspected thief, charges such person with
other similar crimes, although having no
belief in his own statements. (Emphasis
Added)
Id. Comment C, p. 545. Comment E further states the following:
It may be found to be within the scope of
employment of a person managing a
business to accuse another of wrongful
conduct or to report to others a supposed
wrongful conduct of an employee or other
person. A servant having a duty to make
such reports either to his employer or to
others, to gather information, or to
institute proceedings, may subject his
employer to liability for his untruthful
statements constituting defamation
because [it is] made in excess of a
9

privilege to speak, if he speaks in
connection with his employment and with a
purpose to serve it, (Emphasis Added)
Id. Comment E, pp. 546-7.

The illustrations in the Restatement

of Agency 2d of this principle are almost precisely on point with
the facts of this case.

Illustration No. 5 reads as follows:

P employs A as general manager of an
electric lighting company. Unreasonably
believing that T, a customer, has been
stealing electric current, A calls T to
the office and charges him with this
before a number of people. This conduct
is within the scope of A's employment.
Id. at 547.
The Restatement of Agency 2d defines "scope of
employment" in §§ 228 through 235. Generally, conduct is deemed
to be within the scope of employment if " . . . it is of the kind
he is employed to perform" and " . . . it is actuated, at least in
part, by the purpose to serve the master. . ." Restatement of
Agency 2d, § 228 (Emphasis Added).
For some reason, the trial court seemed to feel that
UP&L would bear no liability for Larsen's acts unless UP&L
actually directed Larsen to specifically slander the plaintiff.
This is a manifestly erroneous view of the law.

The issue is not

whether UP&L specifically directed Ms. Larsen to make defamatory
statements; but rather whether the defamatory statements were
made within the scope of her employment.

Conduct is within the

scope of the employment if it is the kind of work that the
employee is employed to perform at the authorized time, and if it
". . . is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve. . ."
the employer.

Restatement of Agency 2d, § 228. The conduct is
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within the scope of employment if it is of the same general
nature as "that authorized or incidental to the conduct
authorized."

Restatement of Agency 2d, § 229(1).

Ms. Larsen1!

calling of a supervisory UP&L employee to report Mr. Mounteer'i
alleged drug use, when she was employed to conduct a drug
investigation, must be found as a matter of law to be the kind
conduct that she was employed to perform and in furtherance of
her assigned duty.

In any event, on a motion to dismiss, this

allegation must be taken as admitted.
The fact that UP&L may not have wished Larsen to
perform her duties in that manner, and even the alleged fact t\
it may have been beyond company policy, are irrelevant.
Forbidden acts and acts done in a forbidden manner may still be
within the scope of employment.

Restatement of Agency 2d, § 2:

UP&L is still liable even though the act of Ms. Larsen was
tortious.

Restatement of Agency 2d, § 231. The Comments

indicate the following:
A master cannot direct a servant to
accomplish a result and anticipate that
he will always use the means which he
directs or will refrain from acts which
it is natural to expect that servants may
do.
Restatement of Agency 2d, § 2 30, Comment B.

Larsen's conduct

would be outside the scope of employment if it had "no connecti
with the act which the employee is required to perform".
Comment C (Emphasis Added).

Id.,

Since the slander was connected wi

the acts Larsen was required to perform, UP&L is liable. By
contrast, if Larsen had stopped at a restaurant on the way to t
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meeting with plaintiff and injured someone during an altercation,
that act could be said to have "no connection" with her official
acts and, thus, would be outside the scope of employment.
Utah case law is consistent with the principles
expressed above.

In the case of Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d

1349 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court explained the theory of
respondeat superior as follows:
However, an employer's liability, which
under the doctrine of respondeat superior
has been termed "secondary" or
"derivative", arises not as a result of
any actual negligence by the employer,
but solely because of the employer's
employment of the employee. ... The
employer is liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, not because of the
employer's actionable fault, but because
the employee acts for the employer, who
reaps the benefits of the employee's acts.
Id. at 1351.

Likewise in this case, UP&L is liable not because

of any negligence or fault of its own, but simply because Larsen
was acting for UP&L.

UP&L reaps the benefit of Larsen's actions

in the sense that she is performing UP&L's investigation.

There

is no requirement that the employer has to intend the results of
the employee's conduct.

In an ordinary traffic negligence case,

such as Krukiewicz, the employer never intends that the employee
operate a vehicle negligently on the highways.

In fact, such

negligent operation of a vehicle may be entirely contrary to
company policy and may subject the employee to dismissal.
However, the negligent operation is still within the scope of
employment and the employer is liable.
In the case of Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666
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P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), the plaintiff sued a real estate agent anc
his broker for the improper handling of the sale of a business.
Among other things, the agent failed to conduct a proper closing
or have an attorney review the closing papers, and made false
representations concerning the financial solvency of the buyer,
which at least were not properly checked out by the agent.

The

broker defended on the grounds that the agent's " . . . acts coul
not have been within the scope of his employment because they
were in complete violation of [the broker's] established policie
and practices."

Id., at 882. The broker claimed, in a manner

similar to UP&L in this case, that the salesman's acts were done
in furtherance of his own interests and not on behalf of the
broker.

The Court noted that the agent had been employed by the

broker for some time and was doing the kind of work that he was
hired to do.

Despite the fact that the agent probably violated

the employer's procedures, the Court nonetheless held the broker
liable because:
. . . we hold that [the agent's] tortious
conduct, with respect to the sale of
plaintiff's construction business, is
imputable to [the broker] in its dual
fiduciary capacity as [the agent's]
principal and plaintiff's agent.
Id. at 883.

Likewise in this case, Larsen's conduct, even thougl

tortious and in possible violation of the company's policies, is
still imputable to UP&L because it was done in furtherance of the
interests of UP&L.
Appellant, Mounteer, has found no case which supports
respondent's position that an employer is not liable for the
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slander of an employee committed within the scope of the
employee's agency.

Howeverf UP&L defines the issue on appeal

very imprecisely; i.e., is an employer generally liable for the
"intentional torts" of the employee?
precision is needed.

That is unduly broad; more

Even assuming that the slander in this case

was an "intentional tort" (an unsupported assumption), it is
manifest error to lump all intentional torts together.

Slander

is treated much differently by the law than an assault or battery.
An example of UP&L's broad, imprecise agrument is its
citation below of the case of Bryan v. Utah International, 533
P.2d 892 (Utah 1975) in support of its position, R. 13.
an assault and battery case.

Bryan is

This case is not applicable to the

facts in the case at bar for at least two reasons.

First, the

injuries received by the plaintiff in the Bryan case were
physical injuries caused by an occurrence that came under the
definition of "accident" under Utah Worker's Compensation Law.
Therefore, the exclusivity provision would bar such an action
against the employer in such a case.

Second, and perhaps more

important, in the Bryan case the offending employee entirely left
the purpose of serving his employer and embarked on a purpose of
his own, that is to frighten or injure his fellow employee.

The

fact that the incident occurred on the employer's property,
during working hours or between co-employees, is only a matter of
coincidence.

It is nearly a universal theme among those cases

which deny an employee the right to sue his employer for an
intentional tort committed by a fellow employee that the employee
entirely left the purpose of serving his employer and sought only
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his own purposes.

In the case at barf Larsen had no purpose o

her own in reporting Mounteer's suspected drug use in such a w
as to cause injury to Mounteer.

Her single purpose was to fol

the directive of the company in investigating suspected drug u
by Mounteer.
UP&L's assault and battery cases cited below are
fundamentally different from this case.

Absent unusual

circumstances, an assaulting employee could seldom be said to 1
acting within the scope of his actual or apparent authority as
traditionally defined.

The typical case, like the fact situat:

in Bryanf arises where the offending employee gets in some typ<
of an altercation with a fellow employee over a non-work relate
matter.

Another common fact situation arises where the offend:

employee, while at work, gets in an altercation with some thirc
party over something that has nothing to do with the employer's
business.

Contrast, though, these common fact situations with

Mounteer's situation.

Larsen was sent to Mounteer's work statj

by her employer on an official drug investigation.

UP&L, as

employer, was the instigator of all of the events which led up
the incident of slander.

Larsen was promoting the employer's

welfare in investigating the alleged drug use.

The means of

promoting the employer's errand, the calling of a mine supervis
at the mine, was reasonably within the time and spacial
requirements of the assigned task.

That fact situation is

vastly different from the fact situation in Bryan where the
assault was totally non-related to the employment.
The law and the assumed facts dictate that the trial
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court committed manifest error in dismissing this action on the
grounds that the Plaintiff must allege that UP&L directed the
employee to make the defamatory statements or intended the harm.

POINT II
IN RULING ON A 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS,
THE COURT MAY NOT MAKE FINDINGS OP FACT AND
BASE ITS ORDER THEREON.
In the Court's Order and Judgment of Dismissal below,
the Court in paragraphs 3 and 4 of its order, made what appear to
the appellant to be Findings of Fact.

R. 126.

These findings of

fact entered by the Court in connection with a 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss and upon which the Court has, at least in part, based its
order of dismissal, are inappropriate.
The Court's findings in this case, that Larsen's
actions were in violation of UP&L policy and that UP&L did not
direct Larsen to make the defamatory statements, appear to be
directed to a conclusion that Larsen was, at the time of making
the defamatory statements, not acting within the scope of her
authority.

However, there was no evidence introduced to the

Court at the stage where the motion to dismiss was granted which
would allow the court to determine what UP&L company policy was
or that the direction which Larsen received from her supervisors
did not encompass the making of the defamatory comments.
Mounteer had not alleged that such was the case for two reasons.
First, no discovery had been taken in this case and Mounteer had
no information upon which to base such allegations at that stage
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of the proceeding.

Second, it is Mounteer's position, as state

in Point I of this brief, that even if Larsen's actions were in
violation of UP&L policy or that she was not specifically
directed to make the slanderous remarks regarding Mounteer, tha
a cause of action against UP&L still lies.
Such findings by the Court are inappropriate under
Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service, Inc., 24
Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970), because as stated in that cas<
a complaint does not fail to state a claim unless it appears to
certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief und<
any state of facts which could be proved in support of a claim.
It is certainly reasonable to assume that in discovery Mounteer
could elicit evidence that the findings of facts as stated by t\
Court in its order are false.

The core of the allegation agains

UP&L is that its employee slandered and caused intentional
infliction of emotional distress upon Mounteer while acting
within the scope of her employment.

Absent any factual

presentations to the Court, the Court must assume under
Christensen that facts contrary to its findings could be proven
at trial and should have, therefore, denied a 12(b)(6) Motion fc
Dismissal if that 12(b)(6) Motion in any way depended upon
findings of fact which could have been disproven at trial.

POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST UP&L ARE NOT
BARRED BY WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT.
This issue has not been urged by UP&L on appeal and
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does not appear to have been the basis of the Court's decision.
However, because of the nature of the case below, brief mention
should be made of it.
Utah's Worker's Compensation Act provides that
compensation benefits shall be paid to "every employee... who is
injured... by accident arising out of or in the course of his
employment..." Utah Code Annotated §35-1-45.

The code further

provides that Workers Compensation should be the exclusive remedy
against the employer, any officer, agent or employee of the
employer for such injuries.
§35-1-60.

See Utah Code Annotated 1953

However, in this case, the injuries received by

Mounteer are not those received "by accident" as defined in
statute or by this Court's recent case of Allen vs. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), or in any of the cases
following that decision.

The injury to Mounteer did not arise

from any physical contact, strain, exertion or other physical
cause.

The injury to Mr. Mounteer arose solely as a result of

the mental anguish and exacerbated nervous condition brought
about by the humiliation and derision that Mounteer was subjected
to because of the actions of Larsen.

Therefore, it does not

qualify for Workers Compensation relief under either the accident
provisions or occupational disease provisions.

Accordingly, UP&L

is liable in tort for Larsen's actions.
The major case in the field is Braman v. Walthall, 225
S.W.2d 342 (Ark. 1949).

That case held that the essence of the

tort defamation is damage to one's reputation, not injury to
one's physical being as contemplated by the Worker's Compensation
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Act.

Any physiological injury and physical effects as a result

of the defamation are secondary to the damage to reputation;
therefore, the defamation action is not barred by the exclusivit
provision of the act.

See, Larson, Workman's Compensation Desk

Ed., §§68.33 and 68.31.
In support of its position in the case below, UP&L
cited a section from Workman's Compensation Law by Walter Larson
that deals with assault and battery.

The cited provision, §68.2.

at pp. 13-74, starts out with the language "unless the employer
has commanded or expressly authorized the assault . . . "
(emphasis added).

UP&L ignores the more apropos section of

Larson, just a few sections later, that deals specifically with
slander.

In this passage, Professor Larson commented on the

issue of slander as follows:
Here, as in the case of false imprisonment,
the only element that introduces any
possibility of serious controversy is the
inclusion of physical injury as an element of
damages. The same comment seems called for:
the real gist of slander is not personal
injury. To block the main thrust of the
action because of this peripheral item, when
a compensation claim could not purport to
give relief for the main wrong, would be
incongruous, and since splitting the cause of
action is frowned on by courts and certainly
outside the obvious intent of the
exclusiveness clause would not be justified
merely to put the personal injury item into
the compensation stream, the cause of action
belongs where its real essence lies, in the
field of tort. (Emphasis added)
Larson, supra, § 68.33, pp. 13-26.
CONCLUSION
The Court below committed manifest error in granting
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UP&L's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and in holding that UP&L would
not be liable for its agent's slander and intentional infliction
of emotional distress unless specifically directed or intended by
UP&L.

Further the Court below committed error in making what

amounted to Findings of Fact, where no evidence is before the
Court.

This Court should remand this case to the Court below for

a trial of the issues.
Appellant further requests this Court to award costs of
appeal in this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of January, 1988.

ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES
311 South State Street, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 533-0222

M. GALE LEMMON
Attorney for Appellant
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Order and Judgment of Dismissal

R. 125-12
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PERCY MOUNTEER,
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)i *

Plaintiff,

F

v.

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
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*

•?*•

if'
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*

X. * ? *

Civil No.jf f 7-s7 7 7 /
(Judge

*
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Plaintifff for cause of action, complains and alleges
against defendant as follows:
THE PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Emery County, State of

2.

Defendant is a public utility and a corporation

Utah.

licensed to do business in the State of Utah and does business in
§alt Lake Countyf State of Utah.
3.

Niki Larsenf at all times relevant hereto, was an

employee of the defendant, employed in the Administrative Office
of the defendant as Chief of Security.

At all times relevant

hereinf Larsen was acting with actual or apparent authority of
defendant UP&L.
4.

At all relevant times hereinf the plaintiff was an

employee of the defendant, Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&Ln),

APPENDIX

A

in its Mining Division.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
5.

On or about October 6, 1986f plaintiff was workinc

as a warehouseman at Des-Be-Dove Minef in Emery County.
6.

On October 6, 1986, the plaintiff was in a

substantial, elevated state of stressf caused by the defendant,
for the following reasons:
(a)

In Decemberf 19 84, at the time of the

well-known Wilburg Mine accident, plaintiff was a dispatcher at
the Wilburg Mine.
(b)

Plaintiff was called by a belt boss in the

"fifth right" area and told that there was a fire in the mine,
and the plaintiff should shut off the power.
(c) The plaintiff proceeded to shut down the
power to the entire mine, having understood that as the directive
of the belt boss.
(d) As a result of the shutting off of power in
the mine, those charged with the responsibility of fighting the
fire were not able to get power to run the hoses and to pump the
poisonous air out of the mine.
(e)

Plaintiff attempted to consult with various

management personnel at UP&L about the problem because he felt a
sense of guilt since he was the individual who had the power
turned off to the mine.

In additionf several months after the

disaster, plaintiff was transferred to the guardhouse at the
front gate of the mine.

In this position, he was required to

interface with widows and family members of the deceased miners.
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(f)

Because of the great strain caused by these

activities, he sought advice and help from various personnel
employed by a subsidiary of the defendant, Emery Mining Company.
(g)

On one occasion, he was told by Gene Shockey

President of Emery Mining Company, to tell the grieving families
essentially to "get lost" because nothing was owed by the compan;
to these people.
(h) Plaintiff was forced to live with this
pressure until it caused significant problems in his personal
life.
7.

While the plaintiff was in this agitated state,

defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, came to the Des-Be-Dove Mine on
October 6, 1986, and, in violation of company policy, and on an
open-page system that was connected to loudspeakers, knowingly
communicated to many of defendant's other employees the
allegation that defendant was on drugs. When advised by another
of defendant's employees that it was being broadcast on the
public-address system, Larsen persisted and continued to make
allegations to the effect that plaintiff was on drugs.
8.

The allegations were totally false.

9.

Defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, had been

instructed by her superiors in the defendant's organization to
investigate the plaintiff for drug use.

UP&L had specific

procedures that were to be followed when someone was suspected of
drug use.
10.

Plaintiff sustained severe damage from the false

allegations in that it caused him severe mental and emotional

3

damage, to the extent that he had to check into a psychiatric
hospital for treatment.
11.

Plaintiff has sustained, as a result of the

actions of the defendant, a severe aggravation of post-traumatic
stress disorder, such that he is permanently and totally disabled
from employment.
12.

Plaintiff has incurred substantial medical costs

and is expected to incur substantial medical expenses in the
future.
13.

At the time of defendant's actions in this case,

plaintiff was making approximately $32,000.00 per year.

Since

the defendant's actions, he has been incapable of working and is
not expected to work in the future.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
- Slander 14.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above.
15.

The statement made by the defendant's agent was

false and defamatory in that it alleged that plaintiff was on
drugs when such was not the case.
16.

The publication of the defamatory statement by

Larsen was not privileged and, in fact, was in violation of the
company's procedures with respect to allegations of drug use in
any event.
17.

The actions of the defendant, by and through its

agent, were intentional or at least grossly negligent.
18.

Plaintiff sustained extensive damages to his
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psychological, mental and emotional wellbeingr including but not
limited to, post-traumatic stress disorder, anguish and
depression.

In addition, the plaintiff has been permanently

damaged in his occupation such that he is permanently and totally
disabled.

He has also sustained extensive medical costs and will

have substantial future costs.
19.

Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages because

of the intentional, malicious and outrageous nature of the
conduct involved.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
- Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 20.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above.
21.

The actions of the defendant, by and through its

agent, constituted extreme and outrageous conduct which
intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to
the plaintiff.
22.

Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in

paragraphs 9 through 13, 18 and 19 above.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
- Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 23.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above.
24.

In the alternative, and in the event that the

actions of the defendant herein were neither intentional nor
reckless, then the defendant's actions were negligent.
25.

Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous,
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and caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.
26.

Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in

paragraphs 9 through 13f 18 and 19 above.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant
as follows:
1.

For judgment for slander, in the amount of

$500,000, or such other sum as may be proved, for permanent total
disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder.
2.

For $300,000, or such other sum as may be proved

at trial, for general damages for embarrassment, suffering,
damage to reputation, and other such damages as may be proved at
trial.
3.

For medical expenses in such an amount as

plaintiff has incurred, and for an amount that he will incur in
the future.
4.

In the event that any defense is raised in bad

faith and without merit, for an award of attorney's fees.
5.

For costs of court herein.

6.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just

in the premises.
DATED this 5th day of June, 1987.
/d

J*. SYKES ~ //
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address;
96 East 200 North
Huntington, UT 84528
835C
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

PERCY MOUNTEER,

CIVIL NO.

Plaintiff,

C-87-3791

vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO.,
Defendant.

The

defendant's

prejudice.

Motion

to

Dismiss

is

granted

without

The Court finds as grounds, among others, for the

granting of summary judgment herein that Utah Power & Light is
not vicariously liable for the acts of its employee herein; that
said acts of said employee were in violation of policy of the
employer; that Utah Power & Light is not liable for defamatory
statements made by one of its employees against another, unless
the employee was directed to make said statements, which she was
not in this case; and that Utah law does not recognize a cause of
action

for

negligent

infliction

of

emotional

distress.

Defendant's attorneys will draft the Order.
Dated this

-n-

_day o

DISTRICT CC

I

u

ATTEST

H. D3XON HINDLEY
.
CLERK

By

&VZ,

APPENDIX

MOUNTEER V. UP&L

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE TWO

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

/£>

day of August, 1987:

Robert B. Sykes
Attorney for Plaintiff
311 S. State, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert Gordon
Paul H. Proctor
Attorneys for Defendant
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 340
P.O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

,V\77Tip

RLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

SEP 2-2-1987
H. Dixon Hind^
itey, <^rKaru_pist. Court

ROBERT GORDON, #1221
PAUL H. PROCTOR, #2657
Attorneys for
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
1407 West North Temple, Suite 340
P. 0. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 535-4256

By

\\

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PERCY MOUNTEER,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 87-3791
UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO.,
Hon. Richard H. Moffat
Defendant.
By Motion dated July 22, 1987, Utah Power & Light Company
moved the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to
Rule 12, U.R.C.P., which Motion was supported by a Memoranda of
Authorities.

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Opposition.

The Motion was orally

argued before the Court on July 31, 1987, at which time it was.
taken under advisement.

On August 3, 1987, the plaintiff filed a

Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition and in addition, filed a
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint together with the
proposed Amended Complaint.
On August 17, 1987, having fully considered all pleadings
filed by the parties and the oral argument, the Court issued its

APPENDIX

Minute

Entry,

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

which

is

attached

hereto.
NOW

THEREFORE,

in accordance

with

the Minute

Entry,

the

Court enters the following findings and grounds for the judgment:
1.

Utah Power & Light Company is not vicariously

liable

for the acts alleged herein of its employee Nickie Larsen.
2.

The acts of Nickie Larsen in knowingly communicating on

an open-page

system connected

to loudspeakers

to many of Utah

Power & Light Company's other employees the allegation that the
plaintiff was on drugs was in violation of the policy of Nickie
Larsen f s employer, Utah Power & Light Company.
3.

Utah Power & Light Company is not liable for defamatory

statements made

by

its employee

against the plaintiff, a co-

employee, unless Utah Power & Light Company directed the employee
to make the defamatory statements.
4.

Utah Power & Light Company did not direct its employee

Nickie Larsen to make the defamatory statements.
5.

Utah

law

does

not

recognize

a cause

of

action

for

negligent infliction of emotional distress.
THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
this action should be and is hereby dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this _J2£Z^day of September 1987.
BY THE^C0URT:

lOTHlffHoffat
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDL6Y
CLERK
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served four

copies of the

foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF upon the parties listed below by
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addresse
to:
Robert Gordon
Paul H. Proctor
Attorneys for Defendant
1407 West North Temple, Suite 340
P. 0. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
and by hand delivering the same this 19th day of January, 1988.

\ Ai / _
Attorney for Appellant
.835/BRIEF

Approved as to form:
/l

Rdbert B. SyKfeS, Esq.
M. Gale Lemmbn, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10.0002.2

